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ǯǫ 
Dr Fay Farstad1, Prof Neil Carter2, Prof Charlotte Burns3 
 
Abstract ǯ
exit from the European Union (so- ǮǯȌ   success and 
survival of the ǯcy, the Climate Change Act 
2008. The impact of Ǯǯa Ǯǯ
the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence 
and elite interviews with key policy-makers and policy-shapers. The 
article argues that the long-term viability of the Climate Change Act was 
being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will 
do little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the 
Climate Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues 
presented by Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation.   
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Introduction 
With the imminent departure of the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
European Union (EU), much work is being done to assess the impact of Ǯǯ  to investigate future policy and governance options. Although  ǯ      elationships with the EU have 
received some attention, there has been no detailed analysis of the potential      ǯ    2008 (CCA), the ǯ   . This oversight is surprising, especially as 
the long-term viability of the CCA was questioned even before the EU 
referendum.i The lack of attention might stem from the assumption that the 
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CCA will be unaffected by Brexit as it is a domestic piece of legislation. This 
is specious reasoning, however, as even the softest of Brexit scenarios will 
have significant ramifications for ǯ survival and success.  
The CCA was groundbreaking in two respects: it constituted the ǯfirst 
attempt to make climate change targets legally binding for a government 
and it was passed with overwhelming cross-party support (only three MPs 
voted against it). The CCA sets an ambitious target of 80% greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions reduction below 1990-levels by 2050, to be achieved 
through five-yearly carbon budgets. Each carbon budget is set twelve years 
in advance, both to give sufficient long-term incentives for investors and to 
bind future governments to meeting emissions targets. An independent 
expert Committee on Climate Change (CCC) was established to provide 
recommendations on the amount of GHG emissions that should be permitted 
under each carbon budget and to monitor progress. The Government has to 
set out policies and proposals sufficient to meet the carbon budgets and 
report regularly to Parliament on progress implementing them.  
In this article, ǮǯǮǯCCA 
are assessed. 	 ǡ  Ǯǯ      
Market and European Economic Area membership and remaining in the  Ǥ  Ǯǯ       
Organisation (WTO) rules or negotiating a bilateral agreement with the EU. 
The analysis draws on documentary evidence and eleven elite interviews 
with key policy-makers and policy-shapers. The interviewees consisted of 
six politicians from across the political spectrum (Green, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, Conservative and Scottish National Party), two members of the 
CCC and three representatives from influential environmental non-
governmental organisations (ENGOs). The first section of the article outlines 
the domestic challenges faced by the CCA pre-referendum. The subsequent 
sections then outline the potential implications of the two Brexit scenarios 
for the main features of the CCA. The article argues that, although it is 
unlikely that the CCA would be repealed, a range of issues presented by 
Brexit risk undermining its success.  
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Ǯǯ 
Created in 2008, the CCA was passed at the height of public concern for 
climate change and amid intense party competition and cross-party 
consensus on the issue. Since then the global financial crisis followed by the 
austerity policies of the Coalition and Conservative Governments from 2010 
have seen climate change slip back down the political agenda. Climate 
change has also become an increasingly partisan issue, manifested in 
widespread opposition on the Conservative backbenches to onshore wind 
farms and green levies Ȃ a level of discontent that famously prompted the 
despairing cry from David Cameron to Ǯ      ǯ 
response to rising energy bills.ii The Conservatives have evinced waning 
climate ambitions in recent years, weakening some of the key policies 
underpinning the CCA Ȃ from stopping subsidies for onshore wind and 
scrapping the zero carbon homes scheme, to selling off the Green 
Investment Bank and dismantling the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change. The party also strongly supported fracking in its 2017 manifesto, 
which critics argue would prevent the UK from shifting away from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy.  
Importantly, the Government is unlikely to meet one of the key 
requirements of the CCA, because existing policies and proposals will not 
achieve the emission reductions required by the fourth and fifth carbon 
budgets (the periods of 2023-2027 and 2028-2032 respectively). The urgent Ǯǯy the CCC on several 
occasions. In its progress report to Parliament in 2016, the CCC pointed out 
that current policies are likely to deliver at best only half of the required 
emissions reductions from 2015 to 2030.iii Similarly, environmental law 
organisation ClientEarth warned ǯ
of the policy gap were not addressed Ǯǡ ǡǯǤiv  
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Even the long overdue Clean Growth Strategyv Ȃ which was published in 
October 2017 and lays out the 
ǯ  o meet the fourth and 
fifth carbon budgets as required under the CCA Ȃ failed fully to close the 
policy gap, prompting ClientEarth to announce that it was considering legal 
action. The publication of the plan was severely delayed by the EU 
referendum and the 2017 general election. Yet despite having had over a 
year to develop the plan since the fifth carbon budget was approved in June 
2016 Ȃ and despite the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) identifying     Ǯǯ 
progress in the plan Ȃ the document includes surprisingly little detail about 
how Brexit might affect UK climate policies. This lack of analysis on the 
impact of Brexit suggests a failure to plan sufficiently for the future and          ǯ -
term strategy.  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the majority of the actors interviewed criticised 
the Government for not making climate change a priority and for shying 
away from incurring the short-term costs (and potential unpopularity) of 
implementing new climate policies. Three interviewees argued that climate 
change was indeed a priority for the Government, although they admitted     Ǥ 	 ǣ Ǯverything they have 
said so far suggests that it is still important to them. Where on their list of 
priorities it comesǡǥǯȋCCC ȌǮȋǥȌ     ǯ ȋ
ȌǤ Nonetheless most of 
our interviewees believed that the cross-party consensus underpinning the 
creation of the CCA in 2008 had weakened. The disappointing role of the 
media was commented on in this respect, with several interviewees arguing 
that the media were failing to maintain the saliency of the issue and, 
according to a Liberal Democrat politician, providing a mouthpiece for the Ǯ       ǯ. One ENGO 
representative observed thatǣ ǮThe whole thing [the CCA] is designed to 
work on the assumption that people will be listening to the Climate Change 
Committee, and that if the ǲovernment has said X but it 
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is obviously not doing anything in order to achieve itǳ that would cause 
political problems. The Climate Change Committee has been saying so this 
year in bold italic capital letters and it got almost no coverageǤǯ Similarly, 
another ENGO representative commented thatǣ Ǯ    
necessarily drive the level ȏ Ȑǯ Ȃ high saliency of the issue and 
public pressure to maintain cross-party consensus are also required. As 
such, the success of the CCA was already under threat before the EU 
referendum, as the low saliency and priority given to the issue and the 
growing partisan divide endangered its sustainability.  
 
Achieving the emissions target  
One of the key features of the CCA is its overall and ambitious target of 80% 
GHG emissions reductions by 2050. Both Brexit scenarios pose challenges to 
the achievement of this goal. At the most general level, negotiating and 
implementing any Brexit scenario could provide a substantial distraction 
from the urgent task of reaching the emissions target for the Government 
and civil service. Inaction by the government will also lead to business 
insecurity, and prevent the investments necessary to reach the target from 
taking place. The Ǯdistractionǯ of Brexit was frequently mentioned in the 
interviews as a key challenge, and most actors feared that climate change 
could become even less of a government priority as a consequence.  
The interviewees also voiced fears that this trend could be further 
aggravated if Brexit leads to a protracted economic downturn. Echoing the 
period following the global financial crisis, climate change is likely to 
become a lower priority if times are hard (though economic downturns are 
also associated with lower emissions). As one ENGO representative put it,     Ǯ  ǯǤ One reason for this 
concern is that even under a soft Brexit, the UK stands to lose significant 
amounts of funding from a range of EU sources, which could undermine 
efforts to reach the CCAǯs emissions target. Most significantly, under the 
current EU budget (covering 2014-2020), the UK receives approximately 
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 ? ?Ǥ ?   nd projects that support the environment and tackle 
climate change.vi Moreover, non-EU countries do not receive preferential 
treatment from the European Investment Bank (EIB), which indicates a 
further potential funding reduction   ǯ   transition, as 
nearly 30% of EIB loans to the UK have supported energy infrastructure 
(amounting to over £8 billion in the past five years Ȃ double that of the 
Green Investment Bank).vii The UK is also likely to lose out on EU funding for 
Research and Development, from which it has been a net beneficiary. Under 
a harder version of Brexit, foreign investment and access to skilled workers 
may well diminish, potentially delaying and increasing the cost of 
developing infrastructure and low carbon technology.  
Likewise, under a hard Brexit the UK will no longer have to follow the 
environmental and energy aquis (the body of common rights and obligations 
that is binding on all the EU member states), and a key external incentive for 
action will thus no longer apply. The CCC estimates that EU policies have 
contributed to around 40% of UK emissions reductions since 1990, and 
cover about    ǯ      ? ? ? ?Ǥ
According to a CCC member, the loss of such legislation would be 
particularly serious for climate adaptation policies, as these are more 
dependent on EU law than mitigation policies, which should be largely 
protected through international agreements. The absence of EU Directives in 
these areas also means that UK businesses lose an important source of 
investment stability, as climate policies become vulnerable to the domestic 
electoral cycle instead. Furthermore, there is a concern that extant EU law 
will start to be dismantled or weakened post-Brexit, both through the EU 
Withdrawal Bill process and in the future.viii Several interviewees were  Ǯǯ
(allowing Ministers to edit large amounts of transferred EU legislation via 
secondary legislation) would prevent proper parliamentary scrutiny of 
legislative changes that might affect climate policies as the UK leaves the EU. 
For example:  
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µ7KHPDLQ WKLQJ LV WKHKXJHDPRXQWRISRZHU WKDW LW >(8:LWKGUDZDO
Bill] gives to the Government to fiddle with EU regulations, and that 
however good intentions might be, that gives them an awful lot of 
scope to get rid of awkward things that might not be noticed. If the Bill 
is passed through as it is, civil servants and ministers will see an 
opportunity to get a whole load of stuff through, most of which will not 
be noticed, and get rid of what are seen as inconvenient environmental 
UXOHV«7KHUHLVDhuge danger then, even if there is not an overt will 
to do that. There is just so much temptation because there is that 
window to junk a load of stuff that you do not really like, even though 
LWPLJKWEHJRRG¶/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWSROLWLFLDQ 
An associated concern is that under a hard Brexit the UK will lose an 
important mechanism for holding the government to account and settling 
disputes via the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). EU reporting and monitoring requirements have been an important    ǯ s, and the threat of being 
fined by the Commission for persistent underperformance (infraction) is an 
important incentive for governments to stay on track with environmental 
obligations. However, a CCC member argued that the reporting 
requirements to Parliament under the CCA were critical in preventing 
progress from slipping and for holding the government to account, and 
would hopefully alleviate some of the above concerns. Yet Defra Minister 
Michael Gove, in his address to the Environmental Audit Committee on the 
2nd November 2017, admitted that new institutions would have to be 
designed to replicate these EU functions and to   Ǯ ǯ. 
This adds to the already heavy workload of the UK civil service, however, 
and there is no guarantee that any putative new UK institutions will be as 
effective. The risks created by the governance gap were identified by several 
actors as the most significant challenge presented by Brexit.  
 
Carbon budgets, the ETS and energy 
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Brexit also raises the question as to whether the UK will withdraw from the ǯ    ȋȌǤ Under a soft Brexit the UK would 
continue to be a member. However, ETS membership requires accepting the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU, something that Theresa May has rejected, calling it a Ǯ ǯǤ Thus as the softer Brexit scenario seems improbable, it is likely 
that the UK will withdraw from the ETS, which poses several challenges.  
For example, leaving the ETS could make it harder to reach  ǯ
emissions targets. Even though the UK has a domestic floor price for carbon 
credits (starting at around £16 per tonne of CO2 and aiming to reach £30 per 
tonne by 2020) UK companies benefit from being members of the ETS as 
they have access to a larger potential market within which they can sell and 
purchase allowances, thereby reducing costs. Furthermore, exiting the ETS 
would entail an adjustment to the carbon budgets and a change in the way 
they are accounted, taking up valuable civil service time. Similarly, any UK 
replacement Ȃ for example a domestic emissions trading scheme or a carbon 
tax Ȃ would be complicated and time-consuming to establish and would 
raise problems of stability, scale and longevity outside a European 
framework. The interviewees were unanimous in lamenting the likely loss of 
access to the ETS. As one exclaimed: ǮǯȏȐǨǯ 
A UK departure from the ETS would also have negative consequences for the Ǥ	ǡǯ
credits. As the environmental think tank E3G point out,ix UK-originated 
allowances cannot simply be expropriated or cancelled as they were bought 
and traded in good faith and may no longer be held by UK companies. On the 
other hand, if no adjustments are made,  ǯs legacy carbon credits 
increase the amount o Ǯǯ Ǥ
Compensation is also costly and contentious. Leaving the ETS could 
therefore seriously undermine the integrity of the scheme. In addition, 
under both Brexit scenarios the UK will lose its political representation in 
EU bodies (such as the Commission, Council and European Parliament), thus 
reducing the pressure to reform the inefficiencies of the schemex Ȃ as well as 
EU climate and energy policies in general. All interviewees highlighted that 
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under either Brexit scenario this loss of representation would entail less 
influence for the UK not just on EU climate policy, but over international 
climate policy as well because the UK would no longer be a member of the 
EU negotiating block. This lack of influence ǯ
climate ambitions slipping in the future, as the UK has traditionally been an 
important driver in this area, and a countervailing voice to less ambitious 
states such as Poland and Hungary. As one CCC member observedǣǮe have 
removed from ourselves the ability to influence other countries about this 
business of battling with climate change with us. We will be still doing that 
in the international agreements, but our particular direct and effective role 
with our nearest neighbours will have been removed. Therefore that is a 
disadvantage, furious disadvantage, in the battle against climate changeǤǯ 
A related issue ǯ (IEM) post-
Brexit. The IEM harmonises and liberalises energy markets across Europe, 
with the aim of spurring greater competition between providers and 
delivering cheaper and more reliable energy to countries and consumers. 
Remaining within the IEM keeps electricity prices down in the UK and helps 
meet demand, particularly for gas. However, as with ETS membership, 
access requires accepting the jurisdiction of the CJEU ǯ
environmental and energy aquis. Brexit therefore implies the need to create 
a new agreement with the EU for access to the IEM. A Chatham House report 
in 2016 outlines the possible options for a post-Brexit energy relationship, 
reviewing the risks and trade-offs involved.xi It points out that a soft Brexit, 
although less disruptive as it retains access to the IEM, nonetheless comes at 
the cost of reduced influence and sovereignty, with the UK having to accept 
vast amounts of EU legislation over which it would have no say. A harder 
version of Brexit offers more sovereignty over energy policy, buildings, 
infrastructure and state aid Ȃ but at the expense of uncertainty over market 
access, investment and electricity prices. Either Brexit scenario thus poses 
challenges for the UK in gaining access to cheap, reliable, and Ȃ importantly Ȃ low carbon energy in the future, which would help it to meet the targets of 
the fourth and fifth carbon budgets.   
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The Committee on Climate Change  
The final feature of the CCA is the Committee on Climate Change, which also 
has an Adaptation Sub-Committee that advises the Government on how to 
prepare for the impacts of climate change. At present the CCC is generally 
respected by politicians, green groups and the media, having published a 
range of recommendations on how the Government can meet the carbon 
budgets as well as reports on Government performance in implementing the 
CCA. It has a watchdog function and an important role in holding the 
Government to account on climate change. Given its popularity and the 
standing of its members, it is unlikely that Brexit will have a significant 
effect on the existence or functioning of the CCC Ȃ at least in the short to 
medium-term Ȃ as any Government seen to be undermining this institution 
would face quite serious criticism. Moreover, as a statutory committee set 
up through parliamentary legislation, disbanding the CCC would not be 
straightforward.  
However, it should be remembered that despite the respect and authority 
the CCC commands, the existence of the policy gap demonstrates that the 
Government has nonetheless failed to adhere fully to its recommendations. 
The policy gap persists, with emissions projected to be 6% and 9.7% above 
the requirements of the fourth and fifth carbon budgets respectively, despite 
the introduction of new measures. Furthermore, the chairman of the CCC, 
Lord Deben, recently 
ǯ Clean Growth Strategy for 
planning to use Ǯǯinternational carbon credits to meet the 
carbon budgets, instead of domestic action as the CCA intends. Similarly, the 
lack of media coverage of this policy gap raises the question of how 
influential the CCC really is. Thus the strength of the CCC is already being 
tested, and Brexit can only augment the challenges it faces over the longer 
term.  
Another reason for concern is the example of the Australian Climate Change 
Authority, created in the image of the British CCC. Australian climate change 
  11 
politics has been more contentious than in Britain, and Australian climate 
policies remain at the lower end of ambition amongst developed countries. 
The Australian Climate Change Authority has struggled to influence the 
Government, and has had internal debates as to whether it should base its 
recommendations on what scientific evidence warrants or what is politically 
feasible Ȃ with three members resigning in protest over what they perceive 
to be the latter approach.xii If a hard version of Brexit leads to an economic 
downturn and climate change slips down the political agenda as a result, it is 
not inconceivable that the CCC will face similar debates in the future.  
As such, it might be the case that the CCC is safe simply because it is not 
worth the trouble of abolishing. For now, however, its continued existence 
remains secure, provided reputable researchers continue to participate in it 
and well-respected and prominent figures chair and promote it. However, 
even such characteristics should not be taken for granted Ȃ as evinced by the 
Australian case. Closer to home, the mass walk out of members of the Social 
Mobility Commission over the Goveǯ
agenda due to Brexit dominating the political agenda, also highlights the 
potential risks Brexit poses to independent bodies seeking to shape 
government policy. 
 
Is it all bad news? 
It is important to note that Brexit might also provide some positive 
opportunities for UK climate change efforts. First, being outside the EU 
might allow the UK to play a more innovative role in international climate 
change negotiations, as Norway has occasionally managed to do. Second, ǯ
Policy post-Brexit provides a golden opportunity to reform UK agricultural 
policy in a more climate-friendly direction, helping to meet both climate 
mitigation and adaptation goals. Third, some interviewees hypothesised that 
if Brexit leads to the transfer of further powers to the devolved nations, this ǯǮ
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  ǯ, as Scotland and Wales have generally been more ambitious on 
climate change than the UK Government. Finally, and perhaps less seriously, 
one interviewee noted that the distraction of Brexit may prevent the 
Government from dismantling climate policies further.  
Significantly, all the actors interviewed maintained that it was highly 
unlikely that any Government would overtly try to scrap the CCA, and that 
the main risk from Brexit related to keeping it alive and successful. The vast 
network of ENGOs in the UK and general acceptance amongst the majority of 
politicians and parties about the science of climate change meant that there     Ǯ ǯ   CCA from being overturned. 
Moreover, the global momentum behind action on climate change and rapid 
technological developments in renewable energy and road transport may 
mean the targets will be met regardless of the poor efforts of the 
Government. Importantly, having the CCA is regarded as being 
(considerably) better than nothing, as it ensures that climate change 
remains on the political agenda in some shape or form. Indeed, a CCC 
member maintained that the CCA was in fact doing its job, as it had forced 
the Government to respond to the issue by, for example, publishing the 
Clean Growth Strategy, despite the distraction of Brexit.  
 
Conclusions 
Even the softest of Brexit scenarios poses significant challenges for the CCA. 
Although repeal of the CCA seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, a range 
of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its success.  
The loss of EU legislation, recourse to EU institutions and various sources of 
funding Ȃ as well as the general distraction of negotiating and implementing 
Brexit Ȃ means that reaching  ǯ   could be harder to 
achieve. Leaving the ETS will entail an adjustment of the carbon budget and 
the way it is accounted, and losing access to this scheme and the internal 
energy market weakens the prospects of staying within the carbon budgets 
(as well as the integrity of these schemes themselves). Brexit might also lead 
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to a significant loss of influence for the UK over international and EU climate 
policy. Due to its popularity, the CCC does not face significant risk in the 
short to medium-termǡ
ǯ-Brexit failures and the 
example of the Australian Climate Change Authority should not encourage 
complacency about its long-term future.  
There were signs that the Government was already wavering in its 
commitment to achieving the ambitious medium-term emissions reductions 
targets set out in the carbon budgets even before the EU referendum, and 
Brexit will do little to increase the salience of climate change or improve the 
cross-party consensus on it. Thus, even if the existence of the CCA is not 
under immediate threat, Brexit is almost certain to exert a negative impact 
on its effective implementation.  
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